The Rise in Penal Populism | Dissertation

The Rise in Penal Populism | Dissertation Abstract Since the mid-1970s onward, the vast majority of Western countries have experienced a significant plus continual rise in their incarceration rates, leading to the problem of overcrowded prisons. We examine the extent to which the ‘incarceration boom’ of many modern societies can be attributed to the phenomenon of penal populism. Specifically, we argue that some short-lived actual crime waves during the late 1970s and 1980s may have initially generated a small amount of rational penal populist sentiment among the public, it is the strong divisions within the increasingly heterogeneous public (both politically and ethnically), the central government, and the popular media industry of many democratic developed nations which have ultimately sustained the growth of both penal populism and prison population numbers. Furthermore, we focus on the types of crime that are most commonly targeted by strong penal populist sentiments in the public and criminal justice system, and suggest that all such categories of crime can be fundamentally linked to the cultural ‘purification’ of children which has taken place in virtually all Western societies during the latter half of the twentieth century. Finally, we consider the limitations of penal populism, referring to those few post-industrial states where such populist punitiveness has been largely resisted, and postulate what the end-stage consequences of a penal populist movement spanning over the past three decades are likely to be. 1. Introduction The term ‘penal populism’ denotes a punitive phenomenon that has become characteristic of many modern industrial societies, especially within Western liberal democracies since the late twentieth century onward, whereby anti-crime political pressure groups, talk-back radio hosts, victim’s rights activists or lobbyists, and others who claim to represent the ‘ordinary public’ have increasingly demanded of their governments that harsher policies and punishments be enforced by the relevant organs of the criminal justice system (e.g. law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, legislators, etc.) in order to combat the perceived rise in serious crime rates (Pratt, 2006). One direct consequence of the increasingly severe ‘tough on crime’ measures – such as ‘Life means Life’, ‘Three Strikes’, and ‘Zero Tolerance’ policies – exercised in many economically advanced countries from the mid-1970s onward has been an unprecedented rapid rise in the incarceration rates of these respective nations, leading to the problem of overcrowded prisons. The United States epitomises the tempo of the modern change in national imprisonment rates, and currently has the worst problem of prison overcrowding on a global scale. Indeed, ‘American incarceration numbers [have] increased fivefold between 1973 and 1997’(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p63). More recently, ‘in 2004 the United States surpassed Russia in incarceration rates to become the world leader. With 2.2 million individuals inside (assuming a U.S. population of 290 million in 2004, that is an incarceration rate of approximately 759 adults in prison per 100,000 residents of the United States) and upwards of 7 million individuals either on parole, probation or awaiting trial, 1 in every 33 people in the U.S. is currently under state control and the number is growing’(State-Wide Harm Reduction Coalition, 2005). Clearly, an interpretation of the widespread incarceration rise must be able to accurately explain its rapidity, extent, and endurance on a global scale. There are two principal explanations for why such a large number of developed countries have experienced an ‘incarceration boom’ over the past three decades. Both theoretical models assert that it is changes in penal policies plus sentencing practices, rather than simply significant increases in crime rates alone, which are the primary factor responsible for driving prison population growth, but there is considerable disparity between the two theories about the causes of penal policy changes. One ‘crime wave’ hypothesis posits that actual rising crime rates in many Western countries, including the vast expansion of drug crime during the late twentieth century, have resulted in a greater rational public demand for the criminal justice system to take more severe punitive measures against convicted dangerous criminals (i.e. those offenders who pose the highest threat to public safety and social order; the criminal offenders most commonly targeted by penal populism in modern societies shall be considered in detail below), such as a more frequent use of incarceration with longer custodial sentences. In contrast, the second ‘political opportunism’ hypothesis suggests that many majority government parties have intentionally overstated the size and severity of the national crime problem in order to heighten public fears or instil ‘moral panic’ over perceived (as opposed to actual) rising crime rates, which are merely a political artefact, and subsequently utilise harsher crime control policies to win electoral favour (Caplow and Simon, 1999). Importantly, irrespective of which mechanism has in actual fact been operating across numerous advanced industrial states, and has led to the observed excessive growth in prison population sizes, both explanatory models can clearly be regarded as strongly related to the presence of penal populism. The critical difference between the two theories is whether the main original source of those penal populist sentiments can be accurately considered to be the public or the state, or both. According to the first model, which may be described as the public-induced penal populism hypothesis, it has been the persistent public demand for the government to impose harsher punitive measures on convicted criminals which has primarily caused the fast-paced escalation of incarceration numbers in many modern nations. In other words, the criminal justice systems in these countries have largely been exercising a regime of penal excess because constant pressure from a large sector of the public (in response to an actual rise in crime rates) has compelled them to do so. In comparison, the second model, which we may refer to as the state-induced penal populism hypothesis, postulates that within many Western countries the government parties in power have often created and sustained an artificial appearance of rising crime rates in order to instil widespread public anxiety. Subsequently, the majority government (and individual politicians) can be observed by the public to be apparently controlling the perceived illusory crime problem, such as through adopting and enforcing ‘tough on crime’ measures, and thereby attain public popularity to secure their party’s (or their own) success in the next general election. The second model further suggests that the government is not the only state institution in developed nations which benefits from overstating the scale of the dangerous crime threat, but that there are also large rewards for popular media outlets or news companies willing to do so. It is argued by many criminologists that within almost all democratic Western countries, the central government and the popular media, which are both fragmented into multiple competing party’s or companies, are highly dependent on addressing and reporting criminal activity that specifically victimises ‘ordinary people’ in order to retain electoral votes and public ratings, respectively. Hence, the state-induced penal populism hypothesis proposes that politicians and media outlets lead rather than merely follow or passively represent the public opinion: the public only supports or appears to ‘demand’ the government’s harsher punitive policy strategies because the same national government and popular media industry (as two powerful state institutions) have manufactured a compelling false image of prevalent serious crime which has instilled strong penal populist sentiments in a large proportion of that public. The central aim of the following examination is to determine which of these two distinctive theoretical positions is most likely to be correct. It is of course possible that the public-induced penal populism mechanism primarily operates in one developed nation, while in another Western country it may be the state-driven penal populism process that is predominant. However, to the extent that the relatively recent phenomenon of globalisation has resulted in many common economic, social, political, and cultural practices being widely adopted by a number of modern industrial states, one may plausibly expect a similar (if not identical) mechanism of generating penal populism to be present in the developed nations affected by prison population growth, especially with regard to the United States and Western Europe. At the outset, we may hypothesise that although some short-lived real increases in Western crime rates during the late 1970s and 1980s may have initially triggered some rational penal populist sentiments among the public of these modern societies, it has been the combined interaction of both political opportunism and media opportunism which has acted as a powerful vehicle in numerous modern societies for distorting the public’s common view of the national crime problem, and ultimately for sustaining the growth of both penal populism plus prison populations, regardless of how those crime rates may have subsequently changed (and in most developed countries they have steadily declined). One fundamental feature of the modern incarceration surge over the past three decades that is observed in virtually all countries affected by rapid prison growth is the significant proportion of these prison populations that has become comprised of racial minorities, including both of resident ethnic groups and of non-citizen illegal immigrants. As one study (O’Donnell, 2004, p262) remarks, ‘one factor that accounts for rising prison populations across Europe is the incarceration of ‘foreigners’. It is likely that prison accommodation in the Republic of Ireland will be used to hold growing numbers of failed asylum seekers, at least pending deportation. It is also inevitable that the composition of the prison population will change as members of minority groups begin to appear before the courts on criminal charges’. In terms of the racial minorities imprisonment trend in the United States, Caplow and Simon (1999, p66) assert that ‘it is undeniable that the incarcerated population is disproportionately composed of minorities (especially African Americans and Hispanics), and that the disproportion has increased during the period of rising imprisonmentThe period of rapid growth in incarceration rates has seen a significant increase in the proportion of minorities in the inmate population, especially among drug offenders, the fastest growing segment of that [prison] population’. As is the case with most Western European countries, the United States prison sector has also experienced a mass round up of illegal immigrants or non-citizens during the last three decades, who in 2003 made up 40% of federal prisoners (State-Wide Harm Reduction Coalition, 2005). Ultimately, therefore, it is apparent that the incarceration boom in many developed countries has primarily affected various racial minority populations present within these nations. It is the cumulative incarceration of racial minorities that is significantly responsible for the prison overcrowding problem commonly observed. Thus, one crucial question that we must address in the following study is what has caused (and continues to cause) the increased imprisonment of racial minority populations, relative to the incarceration rate of the racial majority host population (typically white), within the modern industrial societies affected by prison overcrowding? Specifically, we shall seek to determine whether pervasive ‘penal racism’, indicated by a greater tendency in developed nations for both the law enforcement system to arrest and subsequently for the criminal justice system to imprison ethnic or non-white defendants compared with white ones who have committed the same offence, is sufficient to explain the large racial differentials observed in incarceration rates, or not. The methodology of the following study consists entirely of literature-based research and analysis. 2. The Origins of Penal Populism: Real Crime Waves versus Political and Media Opportunism It is widely acknowledged that the prevalent public sentiment in many developed countries to ‘get tough’ with criminals has played a central role in catalysing the incarceration surge which has occurred in these nations since the mid-1970s onward, an influential social movement that is referred to as penal populism. Furthermore, whether one regards the source of that penal populism as stemming from a rational public response to actual rising crime rates or, conversely, as triggered by public exposure to political and media manipulation, the measured strength of the public’s demand on their respective democratic governments to impose harsher punitive measures on convicted criminals has remained consistently high over the thirty year period of vast growth in incarceration numbers. For example, with regard to the United States, one study notes that the time series of public responses to the survey question of whether courts are too lenient has remained highly stable since 1972 (Caplow and Simon, 1999). The significant temporal correlation in many modern industrial states between the onset of strong public desire since around the mid-1970s for more stringent crime policies and the period of rapid prison population growth is a clear indication of the vital part that penal populist sentiments have played in causing prison overcrowding. One may plausibly argue that the strong growth of penal populist sentiments in most advanced industrial societies over the past three decades has been initially generated by temporary real increases in crime (including the rapid expansion of a drug-crime economy during the 1980s) and sustained by an increased reliance of governments on implementing harsher crime control measures (rather than more effective social welfare policies) to gain public support plus secure electoral favour. Accordingly, we intend to demonstrate that penal populism in developed nations is a product of both short-lived actual crime waves and manipulative political opportunism. Indeed, one would theoretically expect the two factors operating in conjunction to result in a significantly larger escalation in incarceration rates (as is in fact observed) than would occur if only one of these forces was present in isolation. As one study has observed, ‘tough on crime’ policies produce prison population increases only to the degree that offenders are available to be imprisoned (Zimring and Hawkins, 1991). Conversely, an increase in crime rates would also not produce a corresponding increase in imprisonment rates unless some suitably punitive crime control measures were in place. During the last thirty years there has also certainly occurred in many Western countries a greater dependence of competing popular media companies, both television and the press, on selectively reporting dangerous (i.e. worse than normal) crime on an almost daily basis, simply in order to maintain or increase viewer and reader ratings. By portraying the national crime problem as more severe and more prevalent than in reality, individual popular media outlets (e.g. tabloid newspapers) in developed nations have become more appealing to public viewers than their quality media counterparts (e.g. broadsheet newspapers) who often object to distorting or manipulating the reporting of crime news. Since the late twentieth century onward, crime news has become a fundamental component of the public’s staple diet. As Pratt (2007, p68) suggests, ‘the reporting of crime is inherently able to shock [and] entertain, sustaining public appeal and interest, selling newspapers and increasing television audiences. Furthermore, the way in which crime is used to achieve these ends is by selective rather than comprehensive reportingHowever, it is not only that crime reporting has quantitatively increased; there have also been qualitative changes in its reporting: it is prone to focus more extensively on violent and sexual crime than in the pastThese qualitative and quantitative changes in crime reporting can be attributed to the growing diversity of news sources and media outletsAs a consequence, both television and the press have to be much more competitive than used to be the case. Their programmes have to be packaged in such a way that they become more attractive to viewers than those of their rivals and competitors’. Evidently, given that it is typically the most popular newspapers (such as the tabloid press in Britain) which feature the greatest number and severity of crime stories, it means that the most common representations of crime, portrayed in ‘the form of randomised, unpredictable and violent attacks inevitably committed by strangers on ‘ordinary people’, reach the greatest audience’(Pratt, 2007, p70). Thus, it is clear that within modern society the potential benefits to popular media outlets from inaccurately amplifying the danger plus scale of national crime in the public’s perception are equally as large as the rewards for politicians willing to do so. With regard to addressing the (largely fabricated) immediacy of the criminal activity problem, therefore, media opportunism and political opportunism are proximately linked in virtually all post-industrial countries where penal populist currents are strongly established. As well as magnifying the size of the dangerous crime problem, the popular media in many Western countries further continually seeks to undermine the current sentencing practices of the criminal justice system, regardless of how harsh they have become over the past three decades. In the same way that the crime stories reported by the popular media are scarcely representative of the actual nature of everyday crime within developed nations, the court stories followed are rarely illustrative of everyday sentencing practices. According to Pratt (2007), that media misrepresentation then reinforces the common public opinion that courts are too lenient, even though they have become significantly more punitive, in addition to fuelling the widely held public sentiment that the crime rate is constantly escalating when recent statistics indicate that crime is in fact steadily declining in most modern societies. Thus, in its reporting style, crime analysis by the Western popular media has become ‘personalised’ rather than ‘statisticalised’, since: 1) it prioritises the experiences of ordinary people (especially crime victims) over expert opinions 2) News reports are more prone to focus on the occasional failings of criminal justice officials as opposed to their many successes. Indeed, in the vast majority of modern societies, the ‘citation of criminal statistics has become a code for softness on crime and callousness towards its victims’(Pratt, 2007, p88), which simply provides the popular media with further scope to legitimately overstate the scale and severity of everyday crime in developed states. For these reasons, the media outlets in many Western countries have played a significant role in facilitating the continual growth of penal populist sentiments among the public. 3. The Transient Growth of a Drug-Crime Economy in Developed Countries It is highly pertinent that the vast expansion in drug crime within many Western nations during the late 1970s and 1980s coincided precisely with the onset of rapidly escalating incarceration rates in these same countries. As is asserted, ‘the growth in nondrug crime has simply not been sufficient to sustain the rapid growth of imprisonment. By the 1970s there was already an active culture of drug use and networks of drug importation/sales in the United States, but their economic importance increased in the 1980s due to new products and distribution strategies, especially for ‘crack’ cocaine. That transformation in the marketing of illegal drugs coincided with political decisions to intensify the punishments for drug crimes. The result was an enlargement of the population available for criminal justice processing’(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p71). It is crucial to acknowledge, therefore, that in any modern industrial society there is not a rudimentary causal link between a greater public desire for severity in criminal sanctions and a sustained growth in incarceration numbers; other conditions must be present. Specifically, ‘a key condition is a large pool of offenders available to be imprisoned’(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p93). Although there had also been documented transient increases in the number of offenders committing nondrug crimes such as violent crime, property crime (larceny), and sex crime in modern societies during the 1980s, these numbers tended to fluctuate in cycles over time, and could not account for the continual rise in incarceration rates observed. In contrast, the number of drug crime offences had remained consistently high throughout the 1980s in virtually all developed countries that have experienced an incarceration boom. However, in most Western nations the total drug crime rate then started to steadily decline during the 1990s largely due to the much harsher punishments being imposed on drug crime offenders (both petty and serious) by the criminal justice systems in these states. One valid explanation for the persistently high rate of drug crime during the 1980s is the ‘economic base’ principle. Specifically, while the average monetary yield of larceny, violence and sex offences is very low, drug crime represents one of the only categories of felony where the potential financial returns are extremely high, and that provides a strong economic incentive for individuals living in poverty. Hence, drug smuggling and trafficking are the only illegal activities capable of providing a solid economic base for a large criminal population in modern society. The initial cost of goods is low and law enforcement efforts sustain high retail prices, thereby ensuring large profit margins (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986). Since the 1980s, drug crime has certainly been targeted by penal populist sentiments in many Western countries affected by a public expectation for greater punitiveness, largely irrespective of how the drug crime rate has subsequently changed in these developed nations, but it is evidently not the only category of felony that has become a common target of penal populism. Sex offences (especially against children), violent or abusive crimes (once again, even more so when the victims are children), and youth crime are three other important types of crime that in late modern capitalist states have characteristically become subjected to a public desire for penal excess. We shall examine in detail at a later stage below what these specific four categories of crime have in common and why they are such typical targets of penal populist sentiments in developed liberal societies. 4. The Increased Dependence of Governments on Crime Control as a Source of Popular Credibility The rapid proliferation of drug crime in many Western countries during the late 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by a great loss of public confidence in the social welfare programs implemented in these same nations. As Pratt (2007, p95) asserts, ‘the visible presence of drug addicts in these countries had become a symbol of misplaced welfarism and tolerance, now believed to be corroding their economic and social fabrics’. Furthermore, the short-lived growth of general crime waves in many modern societies during the late twentieth century led to a significant decline of public assurance in the competence of their respective governments to control the state. As one study remarks, ‘the international crime waves of the 1960s and 1970s helped diminish the prestige of national governments all over the industrial world, by calling into question their capacity to maintain social order. The increase of crime rates at a time of increasing government efforts to help the poor undermined many of the traditional arguments for welfare, and helped confirm the view of many conservatives that efforts to help the poor only made circumstances worse by eliminating incentives for self improvement’(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p88). It is difficult to determine whether the crime wave was caused by expansions in welfare programs or merely coincided with them. The main point is that in addition to the direct relationship between high rates of crime and demands for punitive governmental responses, the crime wave may have indirectly diminished the prestige of and public demand for welfare-oriented government (Caplow and Simon, 1999). Thus, it is argued that during the 1980s many Western governments shifted the priority of their domestic agendas away from welfare policies toward crime control policies. Initially, it was most often right wing conservative politicians that promoted ‘tough on crime’ punitive measures, making crime a political issue and gaining public support. However, Lappi-Seppà ¤là ¤ (2002, p92) suggests that mainstream opposition (i.e. left wing) parties are then forced into advocating punitive policies as well, because although these left wing parties want to ‘distance themselves from the populist programmes of the right wing movements, there is one area where they do not like to disagree – the requirement of being ‘tough on crime’. No party seems to be willing to accuse another of exaggeration when it comes to measures against criminality. Being ‘soft on crime’ is an accusation that no [governmental party] wants to accept. And it is that fear of being softer than one’s political opponents which tends to drive politicians, in the end, to the extremes of penal excess’. It is plausible to argue, therefore, that constant competition between opposing governmental factions for public favour in liberal democracies has created an ‘punitive arms race’ of political opportunism, whereby each party is compelled to promote plus (when in power) implement increasingly more radical punitive policies – irrespective of the actual level of crime that the country is experiencing – in order to avoid appearing weak on crime and consequently losing valuable electoral votes to their political opponents who are prepared to be more severe on criminals. Clearly, such an opportunistic punitive arms race occurring within the governments of developed nations would lead to an exponential increase in the prison population numbers of these countries, and ultimately to prison overcrowding. That political mechanism may at least partly explain why so many Western countries which have experienced a large decrease in crime rates since the mid-1990s and into the early twenty-first century have still reported a rising prison population. For example, Pratt (2006, p1) observes that since 1999 Labour led coalition governments in New Zealand have strongly adhered to Britain’s New Labour ‘approach to crime and punishment, even using the famous phrase ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ in its election manifestoes of 2002 and 2005. As a consequence, while [New Zealand’s] recorded crime rate has dropped by 25% in the last ten years, its imprisonment rate has increased to 189 per 100,000, one of the highest of Western countries’. Yet it is not only the divisions (i.e. in terms of competing parties) within Western democratic governments that have catalysed the increased political focus on crime control, but also the growing number of divisions among the public itself. Indeed, modern society in many developed nations (such as the United Kingdom and the United States) has become increasingly heterogeneous since the late twentieth century, and consequently the number of bases of division within these societies has expanded. For example, the members of a diverse post-industrial society are not only partitioned along the traditional parameter of social class, but are also strongly divided by a number of dichotomous value-based issues that are characteristic of ‘post-materialist’ politics such as abortion, gay rights, animal rights (e.g. fox hunting), mass immigration, school prayer, and capital punishment where it still exists (Caplow and Simon, 1999). These value- or identity-based issues are intensely contested over in modern societies by well-organised pressure groups on either side of the bipolar political spectrum. These issues are bipolar or dichotomous in the sense that they are non-negotiable with no ‘middle ground’; one either supports abortion rights or one opposes them. Hence, public division on these post-materialist issues is inevitable. One important consequence of the heterogeneous publics of Western countries becoming divided by such a multitude of value conflicts during the 1970s onward is that government parties had difficulty finding any issues to build successful election campaigns on that would appeal to a vast majority of the public. Harsher crime control appeared to be a clear choice as a singular issue that large sections of the modern public are united in consensus on. As is stated, ‘Unlike most values issues on the left or right, crime control seems to cut across the political spectrumPoliticians seeking to build viable majorities inevitably turn to the few issues that can bring people together in the new political landscapeThat is why election campaigns continue to focus on crime and punishment issues even when opposing candidates agree in their support of punitive anticrime measures. Faced with voters who split on so many issues and who are profoundly sceptical about the ability of government to improve their lives through welfare-oriented interventions, the mode of governing that commands the broadest support – punitiveness toward criminal offenders – is understandably [valued by governments]’(Caplow and Simon, 1999, p83). Ultimately, therefore, while short-lived actual increases in crime rates during the late 1970s and 1980s may have initially triggered the rise in imprisonment rates in a number of developed countries, political opportunism (in the sense of governments capitalising on populist punitiveness) has arguably sustained the incarceration boom in virtually all Western nations affected by prison overcrowding, regardless of how those crime rates may have subsequently changed. 5. The Target Crimes of Penal Populism There is a high degree of uniformity across all Western nations that have experienced an incarceration surge over the past three decades in the types of crime that are most commonly subjected to strong public demand for harsh punitive sanctions. Generally, the four most frequent felony targets of penal populism are: Drug crime; Sex offences, especially when the victims are children; Child abuse (physical, sexual, or psychological), and; Youth crime. Correspondingly, these have also been some of the fastest growing segments of prison and boot camp populations in many developed countries during recent years. One fundamental property that the above four categories of crime have in common is that children are extremely vulnerable to the effects of all of them. We may validly question why children have come to occupy such a central place in the penal populist sentiments of modern industrial societies. Pratt (2007, p96) remarks that ‘crime control policy driven by penal populism targets ‘others’, not ordinary, ‘normal’ peopleGiven the nature of populism, we should expect that crime control policy will gravitate towards easy and familiar targets, for whom there is likely to be the least public sympathy, the most social distance and the fewest authoritative voices (if any) to speak on their behalf: tho

Multiple Births: Twins, Triplets, and Beyond Essay

Abstract The high number of multiple pregnancies is a concern because women who are expecting more than one baby are at increased risk of certain pregnancy complications, including premature birth. Multiple Births: Twins, Triplets, and Beyond References Martin, J.A., et al. Births: Final Data for 2006. National Vital Statistics Reports, volume 57, number 7, January 7, 2009. Reddy, U.M., et al. Relationship of Maternal Body Mass Index and Height to Twinning. Obstetrics and Gynecology, volume 105, number 3, March 2005, pages 593-597. Wright, V.C., et al. Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance–2005. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, volume 57 (SS05), June 20, 2008. Practice Committee of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Fertility and Sterility, volume 86, Supplement 5, November 2006, pages S51-52. American Society for Reproductive Medicine. Multiple Pregnancy and Birth: Twins, Triplets, and Higher Order Multiples: A Guide for Patients. Birmingham AL, 2004, accessed 12/16/08. Rossi, C., and D’Addario, V. Laser Therapy and Serial Amnioreduction as Treatment for Twin-Twin Transfusion Syndrome: A Metaanalysis and Review of Literature. American Jour nal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, volume 198, number 2, February 2008, pages 147-152. Lopriore, E. et al. Risk Factors for Neurodevelopment Impairment in Twin-Twin Transfusion Syndrome Treated With Fetoscopic Laser Surgery. Obstetrics and Gynecology, volume 113, number 2, February 2009, pages 361-366. Senat, M.V., et al. Endoscopic Laser Surgery versus Serial Amnioreduction for Severe Twin-to-Twin Transfusion Syndrome. New England Journal of Medicine, volume 351, number 2, July 8, 2004, pages 136-144. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). Multiple Gestation: Complicated Twin, Triplet, and Higher-Order Multifetal Pregnancy. ACOG Practice Bulletin, number 56, October 2004. Institute of Medicine. Weight Gain During Pregnancy: Reexamining the Guidelines. May 2009. New York: National Academy of Sciences, accessed 12/8/09. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). Having Twins: Patient Education Pamphlet. ACOG, Washington, DC, 2004, accessed 12/9/08. When a woman is carrying one baby, it is called a singleton pregnancy. When She is carrying two or more babies it is called multiple births. In the past 2 decades, the rate of multiple births in the United States jumped dramatically. The rate of twin births increased by 70 percent between 1980 and 2004, and the rate of higher-order multiples (triplets or more) increased four-fold between 1980 and 1998 . However, the rapid rise in multiple birth rates may be ending. In 2005 and 2006, the rate of twin births remained stable . The rate of higher-order multiple births has declined 21 percent since its peak in 1998 . Today, more than 3 percent of babies in this country are born in sets of two, three or more; about 95 percent of these multiple births are twins. The high number of multiple pregnancies is a concern because women who are expecting more than one baby are at increased risk of certain pregnancy complications, including premature birth . Premature babies are at risk of serious health problems during the newborn period, as well as lasting disabilities and death. Some of the complications associated with multiple pregnancy can be minimized or prevented when they are diagnosed early. There are a number of steps a pregnant woman and her health care provider can take to help improve the chances that her babies will be born healthy. About one-third of the increase in multiple pregnancies is due to the fact that more women over age 30 are having babies. Women in this age group are more likely than younger women to conceive multiples. The remainder of the increase is due to the use of fertility treatments, including fertility-stimulating drugs and assisted reproductive technologies (ART), such as in vitro fertilization (IVF). In IVF, eggs are removed from the mother, fertilized in a laboratory dish and then transferred to the uterus.  About 44 percent of ART pregnancies result in twins, and about 5 percent in triplets or more. Doctors now monitor fertility treatments carefully so that women have fewer, but healthier, babies. This involves limiting the number of embryos transferred during IVF. In 2006, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology issued updated guidelines on the best number of embryos to transfer, depending on a woman’s age and other factors . For example, the guidelines recommend that doctors transfer no more than two embryos for women under age 35, and consider transferring only one embryo for women in this age group who are considered most likely to become pregnant. Doctors monitor women taking certain fertility drugs with ultrasound. If ultrasound shows that a large number of eggs could be released during a treatment cycle, the doctor can stop the treatment and counsel the woman accordingly. The following factors can increase the chances that a woman will conceive multiples: †¢Fertility treatment †¢Age over 30 years †¢A personal or family history of fraternal (non-identical) twins †¢Obesity or taller-than-average height †¢African-American race (African-American women are more likely to have fraternal twins than caucasian women, and Asian women are the least likely to have fraternal twins) Although previous generations often were surprised by a multiple birth, today most parents-to-be learn the news fairly early. A routine first-trimester ultrasound can detect most multiples. (Sometimes a twin pregnancy that is identified very early is later found to have only one fetus. This is called â€Å"vanishing twin syndrome,† and its cause is not well understood. The surviving twin generally is not harmed.) Other factors can alert a health care provider that a woman may be expecting twins or more. These include: †¢Rapid weight gain during the first trimester †¢The uterus being larger than expected †¢Severe pregnancy-related nausea and vomiting (morning sickness) †¢More than one heartbeat heard by a provider using a hand-held ultrasound device (Doppler) †¢More fetal movement than the woman experienced in a previous  singleton pregnancy †¢Abnormal results on maternal blood screening done around 16 weeks of pregnancy to screen for certain birth defects A health care provider who suspects a multiple pregnancy most likely recommends that the woman have an ultrasound to find out for sure. Women who are expecting more than one baby are at increased risk of a number of pregnancy complications. The more babies a woman is carrying at once, the greater her risk. Common complications include: Premature birth: About 60 percent of twins, more than 90 percent of triplets, and virtually all quadruplets and higher-order multiples are born premature . The length of pregnancy decreases with each additional baby. On average, most singleton pregnancies last 39 weeks; for twins, 35 weeks; for triplets, 32 weeks; and for quadruplets, 29 weeks. Low birth weight (LBW): More than half of twins and almost all higher-order multiples are born with low birth weight (less than 5 ½ pounds or 2,500 grams). LBW can result from premature birth and/or poor fetal growth. Both are common in multiple pregnancies. Twin-twin transfusion syndrome (TTTS): About 10 percent of identical twins who share a placenta develop this complication. TTTS occurs when a connection between the two babies’ blood vessels in the placenta causes one baby to get too much blood flow and the other too little. Until recently, severe cases often resulted in the loss of both babies. Preeclampsia: Women expecting twins are more than twice as likely as women with a singleton pregnancy to develop this complication, characterized by high blood pressure, protein in the urine and generalized edema. Severe cases can be dangerous for mother and baby. In some cases, the baby must be delivered early to prevent serious complications. Gestational diabetes: Women carrying multiples are at increased risk of this pregnancy-related form of diabetes. This condition can cause the baby to grow especially large, increasing the risk of injuries to mother and baby during vaginal birth. Babies born to women with gestational diabetes also may have breathing and other problems during the newborn period. Early diagnosis and management of these complications can help protect mother and babies. Women who are expecting multiples generally need to visit their health care providers more frequently than women expecting one baby. These extra visits  can help prevent, detect and treat the complications that develop more often in a multiple pregnancy. Health care providers may recommend twice-monthly visits during the second trimester and weekly (or more frequent) visits during the third trimester. During the third trimester, the provider may recommend tests of fetal well-being. These include. Eating right and gaining the recommended amount of weight reduces the risk of having a premature or LBW baby in singleton, as well as multiple, gestations. A healthy weight gain is especially important if a woman is pregnant with multiples because they have a higher risk of premature birth and LBW than singletons. The chance of a cesarean birth is higher in twin than in singleton births. However, a pregnant woman has a good chance of having a normal vaginal delivery if both babies are in a head-down position and there are no other complications. When a woman is carrying three or more babies, a cesarean birth usually is recommended because it is safer for the babies.

Linguistics and Sociolinguistics Essay

It is dif? cult to see adequately the functions of language, because it is so deeply rooted in the whole of human behaviour that it may be suspected that there is little in the functional side of our conscious behaviour in which language does not play its part. Sapir (1933) Language is a complicated business. In everyday talk, we use the word ‘language’ in many different ways. It isn’t clear how ‘language’ should be de? ned or what the person on the street thinks it actually is! We talk about how miraculously a child’s ‘language’ is developing but how they make charming ‘grammar mistakes’, like me maden that instead of ‘I made that’. Here, language is an ability that is blossoming in the child. But the word is used in a myriad of different ways. For example, people have strong views about how beautiful or how hideous the ‘language’ is of some region or country or age group; how it sounds to the ear. People say ‘I just adore Italian or an Irish accent. ’ They grimace or smile at teenager talk on television. Here ‘language’ is being judged aesthetically. By contrast, we remark that you can’t really appreciate a culture without knowing the ‘language’, as when we learn French or Japanese for that reason. Then pupils struggle with rules for tenses like the passe compose and imparfait or have to memorize genders and irregular verb conjugations, matters of grammar which seem a million miles from cuisine, ? lm, high tech or Zen Buddhism. ‘Language’ here equates with grammar. 1 Language and society Then, people relate the word ‘language’ to the expression of thoughts. They often say that they ‘can’t ? nd the words’ for their thoughts or express feelings. Or they are ‘hunting for the right words’. Alternatively, we say that language is a means of communication. Politicians often use as an excuse the fact that their message ‘just isn’t getting across’ because the media distorts what they say. In negotiations or relationships, when communication fails, we say, ‘they just don’t speak the same language’. In another sense, ‘language’ refers to a school subject. It makes sense to say that ‘little Mary is behind in her English’, although you’d never know it when you hear her chatting with her friends. ‘Language’ is being viewed as a set of skills acquired in school. We are taught to write Standard English and spell correctly. At the same time, we use the term ‘language’ analogically, as a metaphor. We talk of such things as ‘body language’, or the ‘languages’ of music, painting or dance. It is fairly clear that these various ordinary uses of the word refer to different aspects of language, and take different perspectives on the sort of thing language is. Or, alternatively, we have simply grouped together under the heading of ‘language’ a range of diverse phenomena which are only partially related to each other. In order to clarify our thoughts about language, let’s look at some of the ways language is viewed by linguists. We can then give a precise statement of the speci? cally sociolinguistic view of language, and contrast it to other views of language assumed in linguistics proper. The primary aim of all linguistic scholarship is to determine the properties of natural language, the features it has which distinguish it from any possible arti? cial language. This means that linguistics will be universalistic in its basic aims. It will examine individual natural languages in the course of constructing a theory of universal grammar that explains why the whole set of natural languages are the way they are. Natural languages, English, French and so on, are in fact the data for this theory of natural language. Arti? cial languages are of interest too since they can exhibit certain properties any language has, but they also have features that can sharply distinguish them from any naturally evolved language. Linguistics and sociolinguistics 3 We will look at some arti? cial languages to illustrate this. The linguist Noam Chomsky, in his in? uential book Syntactic Structures (1957), employed the following languages in the course of his arguments: (i) (ii) (iii) ab, aabb, aaabbb, . . . and all sentences of the same type. aa, bb, abba, baab, aaaa, bbbb, aabbaa, abbbba, . . . and all sentences of the same type. aa, bb, abab, baba, aaaa, bbbb, aabaab, abbabb, . . . and all sentences of the same type. Why would we want to call (i), (ii) or (iii) languages? The answer is that they have certain properties of any language. They have a vocabulary of symbols, in this case two letters of the alphabet ‘a’ and ‘b’. Also, they have a syntax. That is, each of the languages has speci? c rules for joining together their symbols to produce the sentences or strings of that language. If the rule of syntax is not followed, then the string or sentence produced is not a sentence of that language. Consider the syntactic rules of the three languages. In language (i) the rule seems to be that for each sentence, whatever the number of occurrences of the ? rst symbol, a, it is immediately followed by exactly the same number of occurrences of the second symbol, b. In language (ii), the rule is that, for each sentence, whatever the arrangement of a and b in the ? rst half of that sentence, then that arrangement is repeated in reverse in the second half of the same sentence. I’ll leave the reader to work out the equally simple syntax of language (iii). Note that the output of the application of their respective syntactic rules to the symbols of these languages is an in? nite set of strings which are members of the language sharply distinguishable from another in? nite set of strings which are not members of the language. In brief, then, these arti? cial languages have vocabularies and syntactic rules for joining their symbols together. And, by following the rules of their syntax, an in? nite set of strings can be produced. Natural languages can also be considered in this way. Thus, English can be viewed as a set of strings. And this in? nite set is produced by the vocabulary and syntactic rules of English. If linguists can 4 Language and society construct a device, a grammar, which can specify the grammatical strings of English and separate them from the combinations of symbols which are not English, they have gone a considerable distance towards making explicit the syntactic properties of the language. And if the types of rule in that grammar are also necessary for the grammar of any natural language, then they might have discovered some of those universal properties of language which it is the aim of linguistics to discover. Chomsky, in fact, used languages (i), (ii) and (iii) to rule out a certain class of grammars as candidates for grammars of natural language. Of course, these arti? cial languages are also extremely unlike natural languages. One very noticeable difference is that the symbols and strings don’t bear any relation to the world. They have no senses or meanings, but are purely syntactic. The study of meaning and how it relates symbols to the world is called semantics. There are other arti? cial languages which have strings of symbols which are meaningful. An example is arithmetic. Consider ‘2 + 2 = 4’ or ‘3 ? 3 = 9’. These formulae have a syntax and a semantics. And they are true, while ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is false. These are language-like properties. But there is also something very unlike natural language, the language spontaneously acquired by children, about these formulae. Nothing in the world (we feel) could ever make ‘2 + 2 = 4’ false, as long as the symbols themselves don’t change their meanings. The formulae appear to be analytic or ‘always true by de? nition’. Contrast this with some sentences from natural language: 1. 2. 3. 4. Arthur is taller than Brenda. Brenda is taller than Tom. Doreen is taller than Brenda. Tom is shorter than X? We can use these sentences to make statements which are true or false, express our beliefs that each sentence designates a state of affairs in the actual world. These sentences are synthetic, true or false according to the facts. (Strictly speaking, it isn’t the sentences which are true or false, but the propositions which they express. A ‘sentence’ may express many different ‘propositions’. However, I will ignore the distinction in this book. ) We can capture a Linguistics and sociolinguistics 5 sentence’s relation with the world by giving its truth conditions. These are precisely the possible worlds – possible states of affairs – in which it is true. For example, 1 is true in worlds where the individual designated by ‘Arthur’ is a member of the class of individuals who are ‘taller than the individual designated by â€Å"Brenda† ’; otherwise it is false. Similarly, if ‘Doreen’ is also a member of that class, then 3 would be true, otherwise false. Only if we know these truth conditions, can we use the sentences to state what we ourselves believe. Or understand what somebody else using the sentence is claiming to be the case. Intuitively, to know truth conditions is part of the ‘meaning’ of the sentences. But sentences also relate to each other. For example, if 1 is true, then Arthur is ‘bigger’ or ‘greater’ than Brenda with respect to her ‘height’ or her ‘tallness’. Synonymy is one example of sense or semantic relations. Such semantic properties constitute inferential relationships between the sentences. Another example. We know that, if both Doreen and Arthur ‘are taller than’ Brenda, and Brenda ‘is taller than’ Tom, then Doreen and Arthur ‘are taller than’ Tom. We don’t have to look at the world to know this fact. It is a result of a semantic property of the language; the ‘transitivity’ of the predicate ‘taller than’. Similarly, ‘is shorter than’ in 4 bears a systematic semantic relation to its converse ‘is taller than’. Example 1 entails ‘Brenda is shorter than Arthur’. Entailments are inferences that depend on semantic relations. If one thinks about it, this web or network of sense relations seems to describe features of the very same possible worlds in which the sentences are true. Of course it would, wouldn’t it? This is because inferential relations between sentences are just those relations where the two sentences are both true! Hence, to specify sense relations is a way to partially describe the ‘worlds’ of the truth conditions – the ones in which the sentences are true. Hence it is a way of giving the ‘meaning’ of the sentences. So far, no social factors have been mentioned. How do social factors ? gure in the explanation of language? They don’t seem directly related to either syntax or semantics. We can begin a treatment of this question by mentioning a few social aspects of semantics. A fundamental factor in making both the arithmetic and natural language examples work is convention. In the ? rst case, of the 6 Language and society arithmetic symbols ‘2’, ‘4’ etc. , we have con? dence that when we use them, our addressee will understand that we intend to refer to sets of two and four, 2 and 4, etc. , respectively. This is an example of co-operative social co-ordination. It connects the sound [tu:] or the mark ‘2’ with any set of two things. It allows an English speaker to use the term with con? dence that their intention will be understood. The ‘sign’ and its ‘object’ have a coded relationship. Similarly with the predicates ‘is taller than’ and ‘is shorter than’. They have a coded relation with the states of affairs they represent. It is important to note that any intrinsic properties that the signs ‘2’ or ‘4’ or ‘tall’ or ‘short’ might have do not explain the link with their objects. Any noise or mark could just as easily be chosen. This is the property of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign. Signs and objects are arbitrarily linked, by convention. And this is a social phenomenon. From a different perspective, the connection of world and words isn’t arbitrary, though it is equally social. Consider the web of inferential relations sketched above. The semantic structure of language describes the possible worlds in which sentences are true. Now to even establish this structure it is necessary for us to use the signs to express belief, what we take as actually true, to coordinate ‘taller than’ and ‘shorter than’ with the world as we take it to be. In essence, semantics de? nes possible states of the world based on our beliefs. Truth has to do with ‘senses i. e. the inferential net’, the relation of ‘words and world’, and ‘our beliefs’. Without the ‘possibly true’ world set given through meanings, we couldn’t inquire, because we couldn’t think hypothetically. Without the inferential relations, we couldn’t reliably think out the consequences of our hypotheses to test them and thus be right or wrong in our beliefs, assent or dissent in the light of experience. Thus, crucially, the semantic structure of a language is the very resource necessary for humanity to form any empirical theory of the world and use language to inquire – to ? x belief and hence deal with everyday experience, be able to live. That the set of sentences can form a coherent theory can be seen by the fact that, if you believe that 1–3 are true, then you can give a true answer to 4, without further looking at the world. Tom must be the ‘shortest one of all’ in this particular universe of discourse. There is no doubt Linguistics and sociolinguistics 7  that the process of inquiry is social. We have to co-ordinate our beliefs and inferences for language to work. Are there other properties of natural language which require social explanation? The answer is, ‘Yes, there are many such properties. ’ Next we will look at one of the most de? nitive social properties of language. This property is called variability. Consider the English word ‘butter’. On the levels of syntax, vocabulary and semantics, it is a single English item; a mass noun which means something like an edible, yellow, dairy product used in cooking and as a spread. Yet although it is one item, if I asked you to describe its pronunciation in English, you would not be able to give a single answer: there are various phonetic realizations of ‘butter’. In British English Received Pronunciation the t is made by putting the tongue tip on the ridge behind the teeth, and releasing the air in a small explosion without vibration of the vocal chords. The r, however, is not pronounced, although it is present in the written form. Instead, a vowel sound, schwa (phonetically transcribed as e) follows the t. The schwa is the same sound that is normally ? nal in the word sofa. Thus, the RP speaker and many other British English speakers say [bvte]. In Canadian and American accents there is a rule that when explosive sounds like t are made between two vowels, the vibration of the vocal chords, called voice, continues through the whole sequence. This has the effect of turning the [t], which is voiceless, into [d], which is its voiced counterpart. Thus, a Canadian saying ‘butter’ in fact pronounces it as if it were ‘budder’. However, Canadians and many of their American neighbours also have r-full accents (as do the Scots and Irish). This means that, unlike the RP British English speaker, they pronounce the written r in butter, giving us the ? nal form [bvter ]. In many British English accents there is yet another variation in the pronunciation of t in this environment. The vocal chords themselves are closed tightly and then released abruptly, giving the impression that t is missing. In fact, the gap is ? lled by a socalled glottal stop, symbolized by ?. So ‘butter’ is pronounced [bv? e]. Such a pronunciation would typify London working-class speech, familiar to North Americans as a Cockney accent from ? lms like My Fair Lady. 8 Language and society This ? lm, from George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, introduces another feature of the variability we have been describing. For Professor Higgins (modelled by Shaw on the famous phonetician, Henry Sweet) to take such pains to train Eliza Doolittle to pronounce words like ‘butter’ as [bvte], as opposed to [bv? e], indicates that the variation must mean something. There is no conceptual difference in the word-meaning itself. The meaning difference of the variation is socially signi? cant and relates to those groups in a social structure who typically use one form rather than another. Such social meanings of variants can be further illustrated by looking at two other versions of ‘butter’. In the West Country of England there are some local accents which, like Canadian and some American accents, are r-full. Speakers would typically pronounce the r in ‘butter’. And this can be combined with the use of the glottal stop to give the form [bv? er ]. On British television an advertisement promoting butter used this regional form, presumably because it had a social meaning to British audiences suggestive of honest West Country farmers genuinely in touch with real, non-synthetic cows. In New York City a working-class accent will, in casual speech, be largely r-less like the British RP. But this would be combined with the voicing of the written ‘t’ between vowels giving the form [bvde]. Followers of the 1970s Kojak detective series on television will recognize this form. Imagine, however, the different social meaning that would be conveyed if Lieutenant Kojak pronounced the word [bvder ] as might an upper-middle-class New Yorker, or [bvte] as might an upper-middle-class Englishman. It would not be the impression of the ‘tough New York cop’. The diagram opposite gives a summary of the various ways ‘butter’ can be pronounced which we have looked at. The actual situation is far more complex and interesting than I have indicated, but we will be studying this in more detail later in the book. The purpose here is to merely illustrate the property of variability which natural languages possess. It is clear that this property requires social explanation. This is in contrast with the arbitrary property of language mentioned earlier. In characterizing the variant forms of ‘butter’, I needed to make reference to the geographical location in which the form

Elie Wiesel Speech To Persuasion Persuasive Analysis

Elie Wiesel, a Noble Peace Prize winner and Boston University Professor, presented a speech as part of the Millennium Lecture Series at the White House on April 12, 1999. President Bill Clinton and his wife Hillary Clinton hosted the formal lecture series. Numerous dignitaries from a wide array of public, private and foreign office attended the event. Although Elie Wiesel designed his speech to persuade, it actually fell somewhat outside the deliberative genre category, as being more non-typical within this genre category. The speech is unique in a way that cascades it into a genre classification considered as a hybrid deliberative genre. Wiesel produces this hybrid genre by bending or incorporating several different genres within the†¦show more content†¦The speech helped the audience understand the need for every individual to exercise their moral conscience in the face of injustice. Wiesel attempts to convince his audience to support his views by using his childhood experience and relating them to the harsh realities while living in Nazi Death Camps as a boy during the Holocaust. He warns, â€Å"To be indifferent to suffering is to lose one’s humanity† (Wiesel, 1999). Wiesel persuades the audience to embrace a higher level of level moral awareness against indifference by stating, â€Å"the hungry children, the homeless refugees-not to respond to their plight, not to relieve their solitude by offering them a spark of hope, is to exile them from human memory†. Wiesel†™s uses historical narrative, woven with portions of an autobiography to move his persuasive speech from a strictly deliberative genre to a hybrid deliberative genre. Wiesel is effective with his speech by blending forensic rhetoric within his discourse. He questions the guilt and responsibility for past massacres, pointing specifically at the Nazi’s while using historical facts, such as bloodbaths in Cambodian and Algeria, India and Pakistan to include incidents on a larger level such as Auschwitz to provide a historical account of the guilty (Engelhardt, 2002). He is effective in lashing together the law and societies need for future actions against indifference by stating, â€Å"In the place I come from, society was composed